Inside Ukraine’s hunt for Russian drone operators

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BLUF: Ukraine and Russia are actively hunting each other's drone operators on the frontline. Drones, EW, and patient reconnaissance permit the finding of weaknesses that make operators 'visible.' Meanwhile, protecting operators relies on digging, masking, EW, and quick communication.

Drones are one of the main weapons in Russia’s war against Ukraine in large part because they allowed Moscow to avoid massive casualty numbers for an already-decimated military. 

Now Ukraine is on a mission to take the war straight to the source – by wiping out Russian drone operators. 

Russian pro-war bloggers reported on this new tactic in late June, warning that a massive hunt was underway for Russian drone pilots, particularly operators of fiber-optic FPV drones. 

Ukrainian military intelligence soon confirmed their suspicions, revealing that an elaborate operation called 'Dronocide' had been launched to detect and destroy the positions of Russian UAV operators on the Orikhiv front in the Zaporizhzhia region. 

A total of 46 positions were destroyed as a result of the operation, which was carried out by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR) and several other military units. 

To pull off the operation, Ukraine’s military intelligence began 'cataloging' previously discovered Mavic and FPV-drone launch positions on the Orikhiv front, HUR told Counteroffensive.Pro. These operators were the biggest threat to Ukrainian infantry and logistics. As a result, 46 drone operators' positions were destroyed.

This was the first major operation against drone operators on such a large scale, but it’s not the first time drone operators have been targeted. 

Throughout the war, Ukrainian forces have hunted Russian operators of reconnaissance and tactical strike drones (like Lancet, Molniya, or various FPV-drones) that attack Ukrainian logistics and artillery. Russians do the same for Ukrainian drone operators. 

Here is how and why the battlefield has been turned into a hunting field.

Fight the cause, not the drone

In spring 2022, when both sides began to actively use drones, they also immediately began initiating counterdrone fire operations, said Major Yurii Fedorenko, commander of the 429th Regiment of Unmanned Systems ‘Achilles.’ 

Nowadays hunting enemy drone operators is one of the regiment’s primary objectives, he said, because drones are replaceable, but it's much more difficult to replace a drone operator.

According to Fedorenko, to replace a drone operator, Russia would need to mobilize a new one (which would involve paying him a salary and providing at least $13,000 as a lump-sum payment). 

This new soldier would become an operator only after two months of training, first as a rank-and-file soldier and then to be a drone operator. And then this soldier would still be at a very remedial level even after those two months, Fedorenko explained. 

"If we shoot down 100 drones, but the crew is alive, they will simply get 100 new drones," he said.

Taking out a reconnaissance drone operator on the Russian side makes them 'more blind' on that part of the battlefield, said Fedorenko. Destroying reconnaissance operators and operators of strike drones destroys the whole chain. 

"If the enemy can't detect our positions with drones, and can't accompany assault groups with drones, then their ability to conduct combat operations decreases," said Fedorenko.

How Ukrainians hunt Russian operators

When Major Robert 'Madyar' Brovdi was appointed as commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces in early June, he detailed the improvements he had planned for his first 100 days. Among many other things, he mentioned a need to scale up groups fighting enemy drone operators.

During the ‘Dronocide’ operation, military intelligence relied on four main things:

Aerial reconnaissance and signal intelligence (SIGINT) are usually the most crucial. SIGINT systems detect the signal of drone ground stations and the drones’ remote antennas. 

Ground stations and antennas are a constant vulnerability and the easiest way to be unmasked by enemy forces, said Inokentiy Razumov, a consultant at the Come Back Alive charity foundation. 

But there’s nothing that can be done about this, since operators can’t hide the signal or make it less noticeable without hindering the operation of the drone. 

Awareness of these weaknesses also guides Ukraine’s hunt for Russian drone operators. The signal power of the drone’s control panel is crucial in detecting drone operators. The stronger the signal, the easier the control panel is to detect. 

And as a rule, the signal power has to increase as a drone gets further away from the operator, said Serhii Skoryk, commercial director of Kvertus, a Ukrainian company producing anti-drone and electronic warfare systems. 

Soldiers use several systems to detect these weak points. One of them is 'Azimuth,' made by Kvertus. This system can detect Russian drones and their operators' location within a 30-kilometer range, Skoryk said.

The system is regularly used on the battlefield to locate FPV drones and multirotor bombers. Used together with Mirage, a next-generation electronic warfare system by Kvertus, Azimuth can detect the location of a drone and its control panel, automatically find its frequency, and jam its signal. 

Foreign-made drone-detection systems have also been donated to the Ukrainian military, including one made by the Estonian company Rantelon. The DTS-2458 drone detector can determine the location of a drone’s control panel with an accuracy of up to a few meters within a 10-kilometer range, according to the company. In 2023, AFU received at least three such systems from 'Sprava Hromad' foundation, one from a politician, Oleksandr Vilkul, and one more from a volunteer, Serhiy Sternenko.

The first step in finding and eliminating drone operators is pinpointing their launch point. 

According to Skoryk, Azimuth can 'see' the drone launch point and identify GPS coordinates, though Razumov cautions that SIGINT data should always be double-checked before staging an attack. Once the system detects the area where the control panel’s signal was spotted, the intelligence work begins. 

When Kvertus' Azimuth and Mirage systems are used, they automatically generate a jamming signal as soon as the drone and its launch point have been detected, said Skoryk. 

Then, aerial drones begin observation of that area, which may take a few days. During that time, Ukrainian soldiers look for antennas and signs of enemy forces to confirm ongoing drone operations in the area, according to Razumov. 

Only after spotting these things do combat units initiate their attack to eliminate the enemy’s drone operation in that area. 

That's how the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade 'Magura' said they managed to help wipe out two groups of Russian drone operators in mid-July. Magura’s drone operators had received reconnaissance data about Russian FPV-units, although their specific location was not known, only a grid within which they were situated. 

So Magura began a search and spotted an antenna and signs of activity, and after this information was relayed to Ukraine’s Air Force, aerial bombs were dropped on the Russian troops. 

"It's impossible to stay in a trench 24/7. You have to launch a UAV, land it and pick it up, and recharge the battery. It is visible even if you stick your hand out for 30 seconds," Razumov said.

Azimuth works effectively for detecting FPV and copter operators. But detecting wing-type drones like Orlan, Zala, or Supercam is much more difficult: They’re usually launched far from the frontline and fly much higher. At such a range and altitude, electronic warfare systems can see a drone, but they can't detect its frequencies, Skoryk explained. 

"UAV operators have always been, are, and will always be priority targets for [intelligence] units," HUR told Counteroffensive.Pro. 

Russian attempts to hide

Due to Ukraine’s effective hunting operations, however, Russians have changed their approach, said Fedorenko, the commander of the Achilles regiment. 

While Russian forces used to get to launch positions by vehicle, they now travel the last 2-5 kilometers by foot and do dashes, or use motorcycles.

Russians are also creating networks of positions on the frontline where drone pilots can go to change their location more safely. They also use electronic warfare and SIGINT systems to cover their operators' positions by detecting Ukrainian drones in the area. 

Drone pilots also try to be as far from the frontline as possible to reduce their risk of being targeted, Skoryk said, explaining that the average launch distance of an FPV drone is 11-17 km from the frontline, while reconnaissance drones are launched from even further away. 

There are also various forms of trickery that Russian drone operators use to try and disrupt Ukraine’s hunting operations. Sometimes they mask a drone launch by switching on numerous control panels at once to confuse Ukrainian reconnaissance, effectively sending up a flurry of different signals, while only one signal is from the actual drone, Skoryk said. 

Protecting Ukrainian operators

Since 2024, Ukrainian drone operators have been a priority target for enemy troops, said Razumov.

A big role in this process is played by Russia’s newly established Rubicon Center of Advanced Unmanned Technologies. It was created in August 2024 at the direction of Defense Minister Andrey Belousov. Rubicon, supervised by Belousov, trains drone operators, develops drone technology, and also has combat drone units. 

One of their missions is to hunt Ukrainian drone operators. And unfortunately, according to Taras Chmut, the director of the Come Back Alive foundation, Rubicon works effectively. 

"Again, the human is at the center of everything… It's hard, but more effective than trying to shoot down drones endlessly," said Chmut. 

Engineering may include deep digging. In March 2025, Robert ‘Madyar’ Brovdi — then commander of the 414th Separate Brigade and now a commander in the Unmanned Systems Forces — described to Counteroffensive.Pro his way to protect drone operators. 

He relies on creating a network of protected and camouflaged launching points:

"These are concrete capsules — a massive, heavy concrete box weighing 84 tons. We bury it 4 meters deep, and it withstands a direct hit from 152mm artillery. We build it with our own forces."

Everything starts with the masking of locations where drone operators do their work. Enemy forces can easily spot certain signs that give away the presence of wing-type drones, and it could be something as simple as large boxes for the drone left near a building, according to Razumov.

If something is regularly unloaded near a certain house, that would also tip off enemy troops, putting operators there at risk. Drone teams should take extra precautions, like unloading cargo only at night.

The second step is protecting the launch position. To ensure that their launch site is hidden, drone operators use video interceptors (for FPV-drones) and spectrum analyzers like 'Tsukorok' to monitor for Russian drones in the area.

"And if you are not working, do not expose antennas, take garbage with you, and mask generators, antennas, and Starlink to the max," said Razumov.

Ukrainian forces have only started to realize how important drone-detection technology is as a race plays out on the front lines between drones that are constantly being upgraded and electronic warfare systems designed to stop them.

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